International Bulletin of Political
Psychology
Volume 6

Issue 13

Article 3

4-2-1999

Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad
Demons in Yugoslavia
IBPP Editor
bloomr@erau.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp
Part of the Military, War, and Peace Commons, and the Other Psychology Commons

Recommended Citation
Editor, IBPP (1999) "Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad Demons in Yugoslavia,"
International Bulletin of Political Psychology: Vol. 6 : Iss. 13 , Article 3.
Available at: https://commons.erau.edu/ibpp/vol6/iss13/3

This Trends is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarly Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in International Bulletin of Political Psychology by an authorized administrator of Scholarly
Commons. For more information, please contact commons@erau.edu.

Editor: Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad Demons in Yugoslavia

International Bulletin of Political Psychology
Title: Trends. The Psychology of War and Peace: Good and Bad Demons in Yugoslavia
Author: Editor
Volume: 6
Issue: 13
Date: 1999-04-02
Keywords: Bombings, Demonization, NATO, Peace, Psychology, War, Yugoslavia
Demonization and war go together in good ways and bad. To whip up war fever, to develop and
maintain morale and cohesion of fighting forces and of those for whom they allegedly fight, to dissuade
and dissipate oppositional opinions to one's war initiatives, to keep one's own doubts in check--these
are all "good" examples of demonization in the eyes of war leaders.
However, demonization has at least three "bad" consequences for these war leaders. First, it can make
less severe and less intense applications of military power less likely to be employed--even if these
applications would have a greater likelihood of achieving the political objectives that are the goals of
most war-fighting. Second, demonization renders the sorts of negotiations that usually follow war more
difficult--for demons cannot be negotiated with. Instead, they are beyond negotiation. Third,
demonization is too often self-reflexive. In other words, in perceiving "the other" as demonized and in
conceiving of ways to destroy the demon, one may become a demon as well.
Of immediate concern for the ongoing NATO bombing of Yugoslavia is this: a NATO leader becomes less
likely to change course even if that course is incorrect. Constructive negotiation--the very lack of which
partially precipitated the bombing and the attainment of which is a sometimes-stated goal of bombing-becomes less likely to occur. And one is too likely to engage in behavior that seems less and less
different in ethics and morality from the demonized adversary. In other words, one becomes--in so far
as identity stems from action--the demonized adversary.
The tragedy of the crisis in Serbia and Kosovo is not only what has happened to Kosovar Albanians and
democratic opponents of Slobodan Milosevic, but also what may be happening to NATO leaders. (See
Cohen, R. (1999). West ponders how to make demonized Milosevic into a savior of peace. The New York
Times, p. A10; Diamond, S.A. (1996). Anger, madness, and the daimonic: The psychological genesis of
violence, evil, and creativity. State University of New York Press; Funch, B.S. (1984). The demonic. Psyke
and Logos, 5, 125-141; Grotstein, J.S. (1997). "Internal objects" or "chimerical monsters"? The demonic
"third forms" of the internal word. Journal of Analytical Psychology, 42, 47-80.) (Keywords: Bombings,
Demonization, NATO, Peace, Psychology, War, Yugoslavia.)
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